Existing studies of fiscal policy interactions are based on single equation models of either taxation or expenditures, without specifying the underlying social welfare function, without taking account of budget constraints and without allowing for cost differences between jurisdictions. Taking all this into account, we derive an extended version of the linear expenditure system (LES) with policy interaction effects. We use this system to simultaneously estimate interactions in both taxation and different spending categories among Dutch municipalities. Our interaction parameters tend to be higher than those estimated using conventional single equation models.
INTRODUCTION
Recent studies suggest that fiscal policies are to a considerable extent influenced by fiscal policies in neighboring jurisdictions. Many of these studies focus on tax policy and find that tax rates depend in part on tax rates in nearby jurisdictions: an increase in the tax burden in neighboring jurisdictions of one unit is matched by an increase ranging from 0.2 to 0.6 in a jurisdiction's own tax burden. A related strand of literature focuses on expenditure interaction effects and has found similar results.
1
Empirical studies of fiscal policy interaction tend to consider either taxation or expenditures for one public service at a time, and are mostly based on the spatial lag model. The spatial lag model is a single equation model where the dependent variable is taken to depend on its spatially lagged value and a set of control variables (see Anselin, 2006) . The dependent variable measures tax setting or spending on public services in the jurisdiction itself, while its spatial lagged value measures tax setting or spending on public services in neighboring jurisdictions. In this model, the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable is interpreted as the degree of interaction among jurisdictions.
A limitation of the single equation approach directed at taxation or at one particular expenditure category is that it ignores the local government's budget constraint, which links spending to taxation, as well as spending in one service sector to spending in other service sectors. Consequently, existing studies overlook the possibility that observed spatial patterns in taxes may be the result of expenditure interdependence (these expenditures being financed through taxation), and that observed spatial patterns in one expenditure category may be the result of tax interdependence or of spatial interdependencies among other expenditure categories. Some studies do investigate both taxes and expenditures, but as long as these are analyzed separately (Schaltegger and Küttel, 2002; Revelli, 2002) and not simultaneously, it is not possible to discriminate among these interdependencies.
A few recent studies seem to realize the limitations of focusing on either taxation or expenditures, and study interactions in local government efficiency, i.e., output divided by revenue (Geys, 2006; Revelli and Tovmo, 2007) . This approach is consistent with the yardstick competition hypothesis stating that citizens judge incumbent politicians by comparing the value for money they receive from their own government with the value for money enjoyed by inhabitants of nearby jurisdictions. A problem inherent in this approach is the measurement of local government output. Typically, local governments have a broad range of responsibilities, and produce outputs that are notoriously difficult to measure accurately. Except for single-purpose jurisdictions like school districts or water boards, a single output measure has limited usefulness. In this paper we present an approach that offers the opportunity to make a distinction between different expenditure categories and between expenditures and taxation and to estimate the interaction effect in each of these fields.
A second limitation of previous work on expenditure interaction is that it implicitly assumes that a certain spending level yields the same service level in every community. That is clearly not realistic. Jurisdictions face different unit costs. The higher these costs, the more expenditures are needed to supply citizens with the same service level. Such differences in spending needs 2 are an important rationale for many fiscal equalization schemes that exist around the world (Ladd and Yinger, 1994) . However, most studies analyze interactions without correcting for differences in spending needs.
A third limitation of existing empirical studies of fiscal policy interactions is that the spatially lagged variable is usually introduced into the model in a sort of ad hoc manner that lacks a firm theoretical foundation. The functional form of the social welfare function that underlies the spatial lag model is not specified.
The purpose of this paper is to fill these gaps. We develop a theoretical framework for modeling fiscal policy interaction. We start from three existing theoretical explanations why the local government's social welfare function may contain tax rates and service levels in other jurisdictions as arguments. We operationalize the resulting social welfare function by adopting a Stone-Geary functional form and show that an extended version of the linear expenditure system (LES) results if social welfare is maximized under a government's budget constraint. In this LES, the committed expenditures of a particular government are taken to depend on the expenditures of other governments that belong to its reference group. Since we do not make the assumption that unit costs are the same in every jurisdiction, the extended LES will also contain a term accounting for differences in unit costs. To the best of our knowledge, such a model has not been derived before, let alone estimated. We discuss the pros and cons of this system in relation to the existing empirical literature, and we estimate it using data on local governments in the Netherlands. By comparing the results of our extended LES with those of single equation models, we find that single equation parameter estimates of fiscal interaction tend to be downwardly biased.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate a social welfare function containing tax and expenditure interactions and use that to derive a system of demand equations that can be empirically estimated. In Section 3 we describe the estimation procedure of our simultaneous equations system. In Section 4 we use this system to test for interactions among 496 municipalities in the Netherlands with respect to taxation and six different public expenditure sectors. In Section 5 we present our conclusion, and make suggestions for further research.
The following notation is useful: the index i is used to denote jurisdictions (or municipalities) and the index _i or j to denote jurisdictions with which jurisdiction i's fiscal policy interacts (referred to as 'neighbors'); the index m is used to denote a particular public service and the index n to sum over these public services; the indices g and h are used to denote two different sets of explanatory variables. The total number of jurisdictions or municipalities is N, the total number of public services is M, and the total number of explanatory variables is G and H, respectively.
A MODEL FOR FISCAL POLICY INTERACTIONS

Three theoretical models
We build on Brueckner's (2003) and Revelli's (2005) analysis of the three existing theoretical models which predict strategic interactions. The first of these is the spillover model. Consider a set of N local jurisdictions. The government in each jurisdiction is in charge of providing services and of raising taxes to fund the expenditures on these publicly provided services.
Suppose that the representative individual living in jurisdiction i (i=1,…,N) has income y i and receives utility from private consumption and from services provided by the local government. However, some of these services also benefit individuals living in other jurisdictions. People may, e.g., use parks or health facilities in other localities. The consumer's utility function taking account of these spillovers is given by
where t i is the tax rate and (1-t i )y i is income net of taxes, available for private consumption.
Q im denotes the per capita level of a publicly provided service m (m=1,…,M) of government i, while Q _im is a compound term of the level of publicly provided service m of neighboring governments. Finally, preferences are affected by X i , which denotes characteristics of jurisdiction i.
Instead of one consumer, we may have different consumers in every jurisdiction with preferences ranging along a spectrum on most public services. The median voter theorem states that, if preferences are single-peaked and government policy is decided by representatives elected by a majority vote, government policy will reflect the preferences of the median voter. Consequently, local government i's social welfare function may be written
Government i chooses the bundle of taxes and service levels that maximizes social welfare,
.,M). Because these derivatives depend on government's i own characteristics X i and on choices elsewhere Q _im (m=1,…,M), the solutions can be written as
where R represent reaction functions, which give government i's best responses to the choices of other governments. Note that the slope of these reaction functions can be positive or negative. Further note that in this simple spillover model, interactions only exist if people benefit from public services provided elsewhere, and that taxes set in jurisdiction i do not interact with those in other jurisdictions. However, as services are financed through taxation, estimation of a tax interaction effect using a single equation model may well yield a significant result even though it does not in fact exist.
The second theoretical model that predicts strategic policy interaction is the yardstick competition model. The yardstick competition hypothesis, introduced by Salmon (1987) and further developed by Besley and Case (1995) 
The utility function under yardstick competition, Eq. (4), results in the following social welfare function for government i
This welfare function differs from the welfare function in the spillover case, Eq. (2), because it contains t _i . The reaction functions in Eq. (3) now change into
The third theoretical model predicting strategic policy interaction applies to competition for mobile resources (e.g., tax competition; Tiebout, 1956; Wilson, 1999) . This kind of competition between jurisdictions results if the distribution of particular resources over jurisdictions is affected by the bundle of local taxes and service levels relative to other jurisdictions. One example of such a resource is mobile capital. More mobile capital within the jurisdiction leads to a higher demand for labor, and higher income levels due to higher wage rates as well as income from capital ownership. Mobile capital can be attracted by offering certain public services, but at the same time be chased off by taxes needed to fund these services. The total amount of mobile capital within a jurisdiction will therefore depend on the net-of-tax returns of that jurisdiction relative to others.
The distribution of the resource over jurisdictions depends on tax rates, public service levels, and local characteristics. The resource s i that resides within the borders of jurisdiction i is given by (7)
Since the availability of resource s i affects the income level y i in jurisdiction i, y i =y i (s i ), the utility function of the median voter, Eq. (1), changes into
The utility function under resource competition, Eq. (8), results in the following social welfare function for government i
Like the welfare function in the yardstick competition case, Eq. (5), this welfare function differs from the welfare function in the spillover case, Eq. (2), because it contains t _i .
Similarly, it differs from the welfare function under yardstick competition, Eq. (5), because it contains X _i . The reaction functions in Eq. (3) now change into
In sum, both yardstick competition and resource competition offer an explanation for tax as well as service level interaction effects among local governments, while a third possible explanation for service level interaction effects (but not for tax interaction) is the existence of spillovers.
Previous empirical work (see endnote 1) models interactions in expenditure levels not service levels. It is important to note that this implicitly assumes that there are no differences in spending needs as a result of which some jurisdictions need to spend more than others in order to supply a certain service level. We do not make that assumption.
Because the welfare function Eq. (9) and the associated reaction functions Eq. (10), which contain both t _i , Q _i1 ,…,Q _iM , and X _i , are more general than their counterparts in Eqs.
(2) and (3), which do not contain t _i and X _i , and than their counterparts in (5) and (6), which do not contain X _i , we will base our model on these functions. If such a model is estimated in the case where interactions are solely driven by spillovers, the tax interaction effect will be zero.
Social Welfare Maximization with Interactions
Assuming that running a deficit or borrowing to finance expenditures are not allowed, the budget constraint for local government i is given by
where T i is per capita tax revenue, П i is per capita exogenous income, such as lump-sum grants from the central government, and p im is the unit cost of public service m. To ease the notation below, tax revenue T i is treated as a negative expenditure
, with
Since Q im are decision variables that interact across borders, and p im translates Q im into expenditure or revenue levels, Q i0 should be interpreted as the tax rate and p i0 is the tax base.
To operationalize the social welfare function in Eq. (9), we adopt the Stone-Geary functional form. This form has been used frequently in studies of social interactions (Kapteyn et al., 1997; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Kooreman and Schoonbeek, 2004; Soetevent, 2004; Grodner and Kniesner, 2006) . It is convenient for introducing interactions in a theoretically satisfactory manner through its structural parameters Maximizing the social welfare function subject to the budget constraint yields the following Linear Expenditure System (LES)
or, if we replace p im Q im by E im (expenditures) and
Expenditures on public service m are equal to committed expenditures on this service
plus a fraction m β of discretionary income, that is, the income which remains after all committed expenditures have been financed. Note that we use a different index (n instead of m) to compute the sum of these committed expenditures. One advantage of (15') is that it is not necessary to distinguish prices and quantities. Existing empirical work (endnote 1) studies interactions in expenditure levels not service levels, since a difficult issue is the lack of adequate output measures for public services and the difficulties in deriving unit costs for public services from factor input prices (see Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003 For E i0 , tax revenue, which we defined as a negative expenditure, committed
can be interpreted as the maximum acceptable tax revenue (Johnson, 1979) . Discretionary income can be spent on expenditure categories 1 to M, or used to lower tax revenue, which is smaller than or equal to
Instead of the relative unit price, p i0 /p _i0 denotes the relative tax base, which determines what revenue level corresponds to a certain tax rate.
Following Pollak and Wales (1981) , we further extend the system by "translating" We use the symbol S instead of X to distinguish these two different sets of variables. For example, a community with a large share of schoolchildren in its population needs to spend more per capita to attain a certain educational service level than other communities. From the literature on fiscal disparities, it is well known that jurisdictions may differ considerably with respect to spending needs, i.e., the amount they need to spend to reach a certain service level (e.g., Ladd and Yinger, 1994) . Thus, we define (17) and (18), the m th equation of the LES in Eq. (15') can finally be rewritten as
To an Empirical System of Equations with Interactions
To be able to estimate the extended LES, the interaction variables E _im and S _im must be operationalized. The standard solution to this problem in the spatial econometrics literature is to impose prior information about the nature of interactions over space. These interactions can be modeled by a spatial weights matrix W, a pre-specified nonnegative matrix of order N describing the spatial arrangement of the jurisdictions in the sample. The diagonal elements of W are set to zero by convention to avoid that governments belong to their own reference group. For ease of interpretation, it is also common practice to normalize W such that the The system of equations in (20) demonstrates the differences with previous studies of fiscal policy interaction (listed in endnote 1), which are based on the spatial lag model. This is a single equation model where the dependent variable, in addition to a set of control variables, is taken to depend on its spatial lagged value (see Anselin, 2006) . 6 Studies using one or a set of different single equation spatial lag models, one for every type of public services, differ from our study based on (20) in four respects. They set:
as part of the whole system, for m=0,…,M.
These restrictions show how our model extends previous research. The first restriction (21a)
shows why our extended LES, even though it is based on the assumption that all public services are normal and to be substitutes of each other, is more general than a set of different single equation studies. In a single equation model, expenditures on a particular public service are seen as depending on their own cost variables S mh only, whereas in the LES they are also seen as depending on the cost variables of other public services. This is because the LES explicitly takes account of the local government's budget constraint. The second difference (21b) shows that we did not introduce the spatially lagged value into the demand equation in a sort of "ad hoc" manner that lacks a theoretical foundation. Instead, following the social interactions literature, we introduced it by making the committed expenditures in the Stone-Geary social welfare function on a particular public service of a particular government dependent on the expenditures on that public service of other governments that belong to its reference group. The result is that the expenditures on a particular public service not only interact with the same expenditures of other governments, but also with the expenditures of those governments on other public services. This result can again be attributed to the local government's budget constraint. The third difference (21c)
demonstrates that a set of single equation models imposes zero correlations between the error terms of the different equations of the model, leading to a loss of efficiency: the parameter estimates will be correct, but their confidence intervals will increase (Srivastava and Giles, 1987) . The fourth condition (21d) highlights that we do not make the assumption that unit costs are equal in all jurisdictions.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
In this section we will describe the estimation procedure for our model. Kapteyn et al. (1997) already dealt with the problem of interdependent preferences within a linear expenditure system, building on the previous work of Gaertner (1974) and Pollak (1976) , but they use a simpler model, and were only able to estimate the reduced form parameters.
In his seminal textbook on spatial econometrics, Anselin (1988, pp. 138-145 and pp.
157-162) describes how to estimate a spatial SUR model by Maximum Likelihood (ML). A
spatial SUR model is a system with one equation for each cross-section of N spatial units at each point in time extended to include a spatially autocorrelated error term or a spatially lagged dependent variable. In Anselin's model, the regression coefficients are constant across space but vary over time. Our model is different because we do not have a different crosssection of observations for each year, but instead different types of public services for the same cross-section of observations. Consequently, the regression coefficients do not vary over time but over the types of public services. Moreover, there are three complications. First, the extended linear expenditure system is nonlinear in both the α, β and δ parameters and the explanatory variables. 7 Second, the system of equations has cross-equation restrictions, since the same α and δ parameters enter into all of the equations. Third, the likelihood function contains a Jacobian term that is far more complicated.
The log-likelihood function of the model in (20) where C is a constant not depending on α, β and δ. Neither of these parameters can be solved analytically from the first-order maximizing conditions. Moreover, the maximum for one of these parameters cannot be found in isolation from the others. This implies that a numerical procedure must be used to find the maximum of the concentrated log-likelihood function for these parameters simultaneously. We used the routine "fminsearch" from Matlab's optimization toolbox. 8, 9 As starting values, we chose the parameter estimates of α, β and Ω when estimating the LES without interaction effects, and the parameter estimates of δ when estimating each equation as a single equation with interaction effects (spatial lag model).
Finally, the asymptotic variance matrix of the parameters is computed for inference (standard errors, t-values) . This matrix is approached by the inverse of the numerical Hessian matrix using the maximum likelihood estimates of α, β, δ and σ using the full log-likelihood function in (22). are not allowed to exceed (budgeted) costs and municipal budgets must be balanced, higher service levels can only be funded by raising taxes, i.e., by setting higher property tax rates.
Tax rates and expenditure levels are set by the municipal council, which is elected every four years through a system of proportional representation. The first proposals are circulated in the Spring of the preceding year. A provisional budget is presented to the council in September. In November, the council should approve the (modified) budget.
During the fiscal year, the budget may be modified again, although tax rates cannot be raised any more. This procedure leaves ample room for municipalities to react to each other's (proposed) policies.
Data and variables
To estimate the LES extended to include interaction effects and spending need differences, We distinguish seven spending categories, which are listed in Table 1 . One of these is property tax revenue, which is treated as a negative expenditure. The spending categories are defined in such a way that they may be considered net substitutes, as is required when the Stone-Geary function is applied. Since a large part of municipal spending is financed through earmarked grants and user charges that are not allowed to exceed (budgeted) costs, municipal gross expenditures may appear spatially correlated, not because municipalities are behaving strategically, but because they are reacting in a similar fashion to central government policies.
Therefore, we use net expenditures, which are calculated, for each category, as total outlays minus earmarked grants and user charges per capita. By considering net expenditures, we are considering decisions over which municipalities have freedom of choice.
Discretionary spending on each type of public service is taken as depending on the same three exogenous variables (X g in Eq. 16):
1. The share of right-wing parties in the municipal council.
2. Average disposable household income.
3. The tax price, defined as the proportion of the property tax burden associated with residential property. Table 1 reports the variables that have been included to explain committed expenditures on each public service (S mh in Eq. 17). 12 Note that, for reasons of identification, each type of public service must have a unique set of determinants. These variables have been selected from a detailed set of about fifty criteria used by the central government to distribute general grants among municipalities in order to minimize both fiscal disparities and the municipalities' ability to influence their share. Since not all these characteristics appeared to be significant, we have reduced their number. The variables used to explain committed expenditures include determinants of the local demand for public services (e.g., number of schoolchildren and number of potential users in the jurisdiction's catchment area) and variables influencing the costs of producing public services (e.g., address density, which influences the costs of building and maintaining infrastructure).
<< Table 1 about here >> All data originate from Statistics Netherlands, 13 except for tax price, which was calculated using property tax rates collected by the Center for Research on Local Government Economics (COELO) and property values supplied by Statistics Netherlands.
Estimation results
In this section we answer three basic questions. First, does the simultaneous equations model (LES) extended to include interaction effects and spending need differences describe the data well? Second, are there any differences between the interaction parameter estimates (δ) of the simultaneous equations model and those of single equation models explaining expenditures on one particular public service, independent of other types of public services, such as in previous studies reported in endnote 1? Third, are there any differences between the committed expenditures and discretionary income parameters using simultaneous equations models with or without interaction effects and spending need differences? These questions will be answered using the estimation results reported in Table 2 . The results of the single equation models with interaction effects will be denoted by "SE", of the LES without interaction effects and spending need differences by "LES", and of the LES with interaction effects and spending need differences by "LESextended". The single equation models with interaction effects are obtained by imposing restrictions (21a)-(21d), to get
The LES without interaction effects and spending need differences is obtained by setting δ i =0
for m=0,…,M (note that the γ parameters are omitted as a result).
The committed expenditures in the LES with interaction effects and spending need differences of the representative municipality will be measured as the average value over all municipalities (see Eqs. 20a-20b)
Using (17), we also have ) ( Just as in most previous studies, the spatial weights matrix W used in the estimations is a row-normalized binary contiguity matrix. 14 The expenditure category and the mean value of each expenditure category measured on a per capita basis are reported in the first two columns of Table 2. << Table 2 about here >> From the bottom row of Table 2 it appears that the simultaneous equations model extended to include interaction effects and spending need differences (LESextended) best describes the data. The highest value of the log-likelihood function is found when adopting this model specification (panel 3 of Table 2 ). 15 Most of the 51 α and β parameters are significant (85% of the α parameters and 67% of the β parameters) and have the expected sign. For reasons of space, we do not report these 51 separate α and β parameter estimates, 16 but the average value over all municipalities of their compounds according to Eqs. (16), (17) and ( , that is, excluding and including the crossproduct between interaction effects and spending need differences, respectively), and discretionary income spending parameters (β m ) appear to be significant. As noted below Eq. that is fundamental to the SUR specification (Srivastava and Giles, 1987) .
Panels 2 and 3 of Table 2 show that the parameters 
takes the value of 9.53, which means that this hypothesis must be rejected. 17 The explanation is that the cross-product between the interaction effects and spending need differences 18 competes with the cost determinants S Finally, we consider the question whether including interaction effects and spending need differences in the LES affects the estimates of discretionary spending. For the discretionary income spending parameters the following pattern emerges from Table 2 :
. In other words, ignoring interaction effects in the LES has little effect on the discretionary income spending parameters. The test statistic of the hypothesis that the discretionary income spending parameters in the the LES without interaction effects and spending need differences are equal to those in the extended LES takes the value of 2.01 (panel 2 vs. panel 3). This value is just equal to the critical value at the 5% significance level so that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. This finding can be explained by the fact that the interaction effects were not made part of the discretionary income spending parameters β m and therefore do not compete with the discretionary income variables Z.
CONCLUSION
Interaction among spending levels in one particular public service sector should not be studied in isolation from other public services or from tax revenue, and tax interdependence should not be studied without taking possible spending interactions into account. Previous studies have done just that, usually relying on single equation models including a spatial lag.
Such models ignore relevant cost variables of other public services prompted by the local government's budget constraint, as well as differences in spending needs between jurisdictions. Using Dutch municipal data, we find that such models downwardly bias the degree of spatial interaction. Using single equation models would wrongly reject policy interaction in 2 of the 7 service sectors we studied. Moreover, in single equation models, the degree of interaction is estimated inefficiently. In the extended LES we developed, the equations are linked by the error terms, as a result of which efficiency is gained by estimating the equations simultaneously. All this implies that the results of previous studies may have to be reconsidered.
In future research it would be of interest to extend the analysis of this paper to panel data along the lines of Elhorst (2003) , and to test which (combination of) theories, expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition or tax/expenditure competition, can explain interdependent fiscal behavior of local governments. To test whether yardstick competition is the mechanism behind tax or expenditure mimicking, each equation may be further extended to two spatial regimes as in Bordignon et al. (2003) or Allers and Elhorst (2005) . x Area of historical town center (per capita)
x 1 Number of potential users of municipal services within a radius of twenty kilometers. This variable increases linearly with the number of inhabitants and decreases with the square of the distance. The total number of potential users for all municipalities equals the number of inhabitants of the country. 2 Number of potential users of municipal services within a radius of sixty kilometers. 3 Including welfare, unemployment benefit and disability benefit. 4 Average number of addresses per square kilometer within a radius of one kilometer. Service sector (see table 2) 1 Allers and Elhorst (2005) give an overview and references of tax interaction studies. Regarding expenditure interaction, Kelejian and Robinson (1993) 2 Throughout this paper, we use both "spending needs" and "unit costs" to mean the expenditures needed to provide a certain service level. These may differ between localities as a result of production cost differences (operating a school is more expensive in a cold climate than in a moderate one) and as a result of demographic differences (jurisdictions with a larger proportion of school age children need to spend more per capita to attain a certain educational service level than other jurisdictions).
